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G. Kecskés
PARADIGM SHIFT IN THE FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS 
EAST-CENTRAL EUROPE IN 1917–1918
In 1914, when World War I broke out, the 
peoples of Central and Eastern Europe were 
living in the territories of three empires, Germa-
ny, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and Russia. 
By 1918–1919, however, the region became 
a zone of newly formed or substantially trans-
formed small countries, with radical changes 
to the administrative frameworks of their lives. 
Contemporaries were already fully aware of 
the active role France played in bringing about 
these changes. Depending on personal involve-
ments, later evaluations have to this day ranged 
from glorifying praise to embittered resentment, 
often stereotypical and exaggerated. Utilizing 
the findings of an already abundant literature 
on the topic, the paper attempts to present and 
especially interpret the process of transforma-
tion which took place in the approach of French 
foreign policy related to the region principally in 
1917–1918.
We can affirm that the French foreign poli-
cy paradigm in relation to East-Central Europe 
went through a radical transformation during 
World War I. While earlier the French foreign 
policy administration did not support the inde-
pendence efforts of the nationalities of the re-
gion usually living within an empire (in consid-
eration of the interests of the allied Russia and, 
in the case of the Austro–Hungarian Empire, 
for the sake of maintaining the European pow-
er balance), the French government became 
more and more interested especially in the 
Polish and the Czech from 1916. This change 
was mainly due to the new challenges posed 
by the war theatres, and not to the pressure 
from the extremely active French Slavists and 
Czech emigrant politicians, or the pressure of 
the French public opinion for that matter. The 
utilization of the nationality question as a weap-
on by the Central Powers as well as the grow-
ing problem of the lack of supply of soldiers for 
the French army put the issue of the military 
deployment of the Czech prisoners of war and 
the Polish on the agenda. Their military involve-
ment strengthened the political position of the 
Polish and Czech emigration in France more 
and more. These emigrant organizations were 
considered to be the most recognized organs of 
the peoples represented by them internationally 
as well. Nevertheless, the factor that influenced 
the East-Central European policy of France the 
most was the dropout of its Russian ally from 
the war due to the Bolshevik revolution from 
November 1917. That is why Paris was forced 
to look for another counterpoise in the back 
of Germany instead of Russia. For the major-
ity of the French population, the demographic 
advantage, the economic and military power of 
Germany and its presumed goals of Europe-
an hegemony were considered to be an even 
more serious challenge at the breakout of the 
world war than the consequences of the 1870 
French defeat1. After the shrinking and collapse 
of the empires in East-Central Europe, the solu-
tion seemed to be the creation and reinforce-
ment of a zone of France-friendly nation-states, 
of which the programme of the termination of 
the Habsburg Monarchy was a logical conse-
quence. Thus we can declare that the foreign 
policy of France with respect to the region was 
determined during World War I by security pol-
icy considerations – as always throughout the 
centuries ever since early modern history.
In 1917–1918, Paris was more pro-active in 
this region than its Anglo-Saxon allies, who usu-
ally followed France with more or less delay, for 
example, when it came to the recognition of the 
emigrant organizations and cooperation with 
them. Undoubtedly, the bigger activism of the 
French foreign policy could be put down also to 
the fact that it was France that suffered the big-
gest losses in terms of human lives. Moreover, 
after the dropout of the Russian ally, it was up to 
France to affront the increased German danger 
1 Allain J-C, Guillen P., Soutou, G-H., Theis L., Vaisse M. 
Histoire de la diplomatie française. Tome II. De 1815 à nos 
jours. Paris, 2005. P. 287. 
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directly. After the failure of the secret separate 
peace talks with the Habsburg Monarchy, the 
influence of France grew within the Entente, 
and it had a major impact on the policy of its 
partners in the matter of Austria–Hungary, too1.
After this general overview, let us attempt to 
offer a more sophisticated explanation for the 
underlying reasons. The prolonged transfor-
mation of the French foreign policy in relation 
to East-Central Europe – it started in January 
1916 and lasted for nearly three years – can 
be put down to the deep divide over the issue 
within the ruling French elite. There were two 
conceptions that competed with each other: the 
relatively new principle of the nations’ right to 
self-determination and the contemporary ver-
sion of the traditional power politics, that is the 
need to preserve the European concert based 
on the equilibrium of the five big powers (United 
Kingdom, France, Austro–Hungarian Empire, 
Germany and Russia). The advocates of the 
first conception are referred to as «Progres-
sives» while the latter are called «Conserva-
tives».
As for the first group, the «Progressives»: 
the question of the nations’ right to self-deter-
mination had been present in the French intel-
lectual life since the 1830s as a result of the 
wave of empathy for the Poles (preceded by the 
empathy triggered by the cause of the Greek) 
and it remained on the agenda till 1918, the 
transformation of East-Central Europe2. There 
was an increasing interest for this region in the 
public opinion, university circles and certain 
political groups (radicals, radical Socialists, 
a part of the Socialists and certain groups of the 
classical right-wing). More information became 
available, and there was a greater willingness 
to find an answer to the self-determination de-
mands of the peoples of the region3. Since the 
end of the 19th century, having seen the crises 
and wars on the Balkans, the Russian pogroms 
and the recurrent massacres in the Ottoman 
Empire, numerous experts and politicians came 
to the conclusion that multi-ethnic dynastic em-
pires had become outdated, and East-Central 
Europe should be reorganized according to 
1 Ádám M. A Kisantant, 1920−1938. Budapest, 1981. P. 19.
2 Marès A. Construction, deconstruction et marginalisation 
de l’Europe centrale dans le discours français // L’Europe 
médiane au XXe siècle. Fractures, décompo-sitions – 
recomposition – surcompositions. Prague, 2011. P. 202.
3 Marès А. Construction, deconstruction et marginalisation 
de l’Europe centrale dans le discours français. P. 203.
a nation-state model4. The most enthusiastic 
flagbearers of the peoples’ right to self-deter-
mination in France were associated with the 
radical party. Their ideas seemed progressive 
and even revolutionary in those times5. The 
President of the Central Office of Nationalities 
(Office central des Nationalités) set up in 1911 
was Paul Painlevé, independent Socialist rep-
resentative, then Minister of Defence and Prime 
Minister, who most probably outlined a foreign 
policy alternative versus the dominant policy of 
alliance with Russia6. When he held a speech 
in 1912 in Médan on the anniversary of Émile 
Zola’s death, he criticized the government’s 
Russian-friendly power policy and shared his 
conviction that the Austro–Hungarian Empire 
should be brought down in order to reorganize 
Europe, and the oppressed nations of the Rus-
sian Empire should be liberated. He suggested 
that France should take the lead in the move-
ment of the oppressed peoples of East-Central 
Europe, thus ensuring its influence over them7.
The other group, the «Conservatives», was 
mostly composed of government politicians. 
Their circles were characterized by indifference 
for East-Central Europe, ignorance and great 
caution in the name of realism because they 
did not see any foreign policy opportunities in 
this initiative that could have been used to take 
revenge on Germany8. All French Prime Min-
isters and Foreign Ministers during World War 
I belonged to this group. They focused on the 
geostrategic interests of France for the most 
part, and after the war, they strived to restore 
the «European concert» that looked back on a 
4 Soutou G-H. Diplomatie de guerre (Chapitre XIX) // La 
Première Guerre mondiale. Volume II, États. Paris, 2014. 
P. 539, 560-561. 
5 Recherches sur la France et le problème des nationalités 
pendant la première guerre mondiale (Pologne, Ukraine, 
Lithuanie) / Ed. Soutou G-H. Paris, 1995. Р.6; Soutou, G-H. 
La France et le problème des nationalités pendant la guerre 
de 1914-1918: le cas de la Serbie // Balcanica (XLV). 2014. 
P. 371.
6 Soutou G-H. Jean Pélissier et l’Office Central des 
Nationalités, 1911–1918: un agent du gouvernement 
français auprès des Nationalités // Recherches sur la 
France et le problème des Nationalités pendant la Première 
Guerre mondiale (Pologne, Ukraine, Lithuanie). Paris, 
1995. P. 15-16.
7 Soutou G-H. Les grandes puissances et la question 
des nationalités en Europe centrale et orientale pendant et 
après la Première Guerre mondiale: actualité du passé? // 
Politique étrangère №58:3. 1993. P. 701; Allain J-C. et al. 
Histoire de la diplomatie française. P. 288. 
8 Marès А. Construction, deconstruction et marginalisation 
de l’Europe centrale dans le discours français. P. 203.
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hundred years of history1. The problematics of 
the nationalities was of secondary importance 
to them in comparison with the former2. In their 
view, it was necessary that the allied great pow-
ers oversee the national movements and keep 
them under control according to their own in-
terests. Nevertheless, this also allowed for the 
cautious and gradual considering of national 
progression, as it could be observed during the 
Balkans wars of 1912 and 1913. For them, the 
fundamental principle was not the peoples’ right 
to self-determination, but that the nations would 
be recognized by the allied great powers3. The 
caution of the French leaders during the war 
was only increased by the widely spread sus-
picion that the leaders of East-Central Europe 
working for the creation of independent states 
were, in fact, allied with Germany. This assump-
tion pertained especially to the Ukrainians and 
the Balts. But it was raised several times in re-
lation to the Serbs as well that they might sign 
a separate peace treaty with the Austro-Hun-
garian Empire. Negative assessment may have 
been reinforced by prejudice about the under-
developed culture of the region in question4.
The several-decade debate of the two 
camps was illustrated by two seminal historical 
works of the French intellectual discourse. The 
views of the «Progressives» were represented 
by the book series edited by Ernest Lavisse 
(Histoire de la France contemporaine depuis la 
Révolution jusqu’à la paix de 1919), the closing 
volume of which (written by Lavisse and pub-
lished in 1922) emphasized the Messianic role 
of France, which defended the nationalities af-
ter turning out victorious in the world war. On 
the other hand, the eight-volume work of Albert 
Sorel published between 1885 and 1904 (L’Eu-
rope et la révolution française) reflected the 
stance of the «Conservatives», criticizing the 
nationality policy of Napoleon III, which contrib-
uted to the creation of the unified Italy and Ger-
many. The intellectual debate, which had been 
1 Allain J-C. et al. Histoire de la diplomatie française. 
P. 288.
2 Hermet G. Histoire des nations et du nationalisme en 
Europe. Paris-Seuil, 1996. P. 158-164. 
3 Soutou G.-H. Les grandes puissances et la question 
des nationalités en Europe centrale et orientale. P. 699; 
Recherches sur la France et le problème des nationalités 
pendant la première guerre mondiale (Pologne, Ukraine, 
Lithuanie). P. 7; Soutou  G.-H. La France et le problème 
des nationalités pendant la guerre. P. 371.
4 Ibid. P. 370-371. 
pursued for a century, was now rekindled by the 
Great War5.
In his book entitled Requiem pour un em-
pire défunt, Ferenc Fejtő puts the ideas and 
activities of the leaders of the group that we 
have referred to as «Progressive» into the light 
of modern French history and observes that for 
them, the aim of the fight to be fought till the 
«total victory» and the ultimate annihilation of 
the enemy was ideological in nature. It was a 
continuation of the conflict that had opposed 
the Conservative and the Republican France 
with each other ever since 1793. In his view, 
the heirs of the «anti-monarchist and anti-cler-
ical Jacobin French republic» wanted to wage 
this ideological war on the international level 
and turn Europe into a republic. They saw an 
arch enemy in the Austro–Hungarian Empire re-
garded as the citadel of clericalism and monar-
chism. According to Fejtő, this is what explains 
their receptiveness to the arguments of the 
emigrants having arrived from the Monarchy6. 
He considers freemasonry as the flagship and 
the headquarters of this combat7. The Masonic 
Congress of the Allied and Neutral Countries 
was held in Paris on 28−30 June 1917, which 
took a stand in its resolution in favour of the 
freedom of the oppressed nations of the Mon-
archy, emphatically demanding independence 
for the Czech8. The thick monograph of An-
toine Marès about the Czech politician Edvard 
Beneš also mentions the French Masonry as a 
key player in the transformation of East-Cen-
tral Europe, which energized the Slav nations 
of the Habsburg Empire. As opposed to Fejtő, 
however, he does not regard freemasonry as a 
decisive actor, only as one of the important fac-
tors9. Georges-Henri Soutou also highlights the 
recurring Masonic connections of the European 
radical nationalist movements and the French 
radical Socialists10.
5 Recherches sur la France et le problème des nationalités 
pendant la première guerre mondiale (Pologne, Ukraine, 
Lithuanie). P. 7, 17, 372. 
6 Fejtő F. Requiem pour un empire défunt. Histoire de 
la destruction de l’Autriche-Hongrie. Paris, 1988. P. 307-
310; see also: Winock M. and Azéma J-P. La troisième 
république. Paris, 1976. 
7 Fejtő F. Requiem pour un empire défunt. P. 337.
8 Majoros I. Franciaország a nemzetközi kapcsolatok 
rendszerében (1871–1940). MTA doktori disszertáció. 
Budapest (manuscript), 2003. P. 195. 
9 Marès A. Edvard Beneš, de la gloire à l’abîme. Un drame 
entre Hitler et Staline. Paris, 2015. P. 97-98. 
10 Soutou G.-H. Les grandes puissances et la question 
des nationalités en Europe centrale et orientale. P. 701.
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While we can observe the interaction of the 
«Progressive» and the «Conservative» currents 
in the decision-making of the French govern-
ment in relation to East-Central Europe during 
World War I, we could rise the question – which 
were the principal factors affecting the position 
of Paris? From the domestic political forces, it 
was especially the Radical Party that tried to 
influence the actions of the government. When 
in July 1918 the French government stated its 
intention clearly to support the Yugoslav, Polish 
and Czechoslovakian efforts, the decision was 
forced by the House of Representatives, and 
within that, the Radicals, while Clemenceau 
was opposed to it1. Without their insistence, 
the Prime Minister would have been inclined to 
stick to his extremely cautious position regard-
ing the nationalities of East-Central Europe, 
ensure the reinvigoration of the Russian ally 
and not leave any power vacuum in the back of 
Germany2. The person who played a key role 
in putting pressure on the Prime Minister was 
Henry Franklin-Bouillon, a Radical Socialist rep-
resentative, the President of the Foreign Policy 
Committee of the House of Representatives, 
who set up the Bureau of Nationalities (Bureau 
des nationalités) in 19183. As a member of the 
semi-official French delegation, along with Min-
ister of Armament Albert Thomas, he took part − 
as it has been mentioned before − in the Con-
gress of the so-called oppressed nations of the 
Monarchy in April 1918 in Rome, the success of 
which also contributed to the finalization of the 
resolution of the French government4.
From the foreign policy factors, the influ-
ence of the British was only collateral. London 
and Paris fundamentally agreed that after the 
war, Germany would have to be substantially 
weakened and its European hegemony termi-
nated. However, the British saw it much less 
feasible to push back Berlin’s influence over 
East-Central Europe. Therefore their primary 
focus was the securitization of Western Europe 
(France, Belgium, the Netherlands) and of the 
1 Soutou G.-H. Diplomatie de guerre (Chapitre XIX). P. 571- 
572.
2 Recherches sur la France et le problème des nationalités 
pendant la première guerre mondiale (Pologne, Ukraine, 
Lithuanie). P. 8. 
3 Recherches sur la France et le problème des nationalités 
pendant la première guerre mondiale (Pologne, Ukraine, 
Lithuanie). P. 10, 32, 33. 
4 Soutou G.-H. La France et le problème des nationalités 
pendant la guerre. P. 390. 
Middle East5. On the other hand, the French for-
eign policy was much more heavily influenced 
by Wilson’s new diplomacy. In light of the Sovi-
et-Russian separate peace in March 1918 and 
the Romanian separate peace in May as well 
as the strengthening of the Alliance of the Cen-
tral Powers, he became a genuine flagbearer 
of the peoples’ right to self-determination6. Co-
erced by Wilson, the French government had 
no choice but to accept the nationality principle, 
if reluctantly, but also in order to legitimize its 
own policy to some extent7. This influence was 
especially strong in relation to the creation of 
the Baltic states and Czechoslovakia8. 
From the East-Central European emigrant 
movements, the Czech movement proved to 
be especially influential. Its success was fa-
cilitated by its carefully constructed multi-lay-
er network of social relations. From autumn 
1915, the Czech cause was widely promoted 
in the French press. During this campaign, the 
negative presentation of the evolvement of the 
Austro–Hungarian Empire was accompanied 
by a description of the services that the Czech 
could offer to the cause of the Entente. Thus 
the Czech gradually appeared on the horizon of 
East-Central European expectations of France 
as potential new and reliable allies9. The dis-
course announced by the Czech exile politician 
Tomáš G. Masaryk in October 1915 at King’s 
College, according to which the only way to 
stop the German expansion was the creation 
of an independent Czech state and the disso-
lution of the Monarchy, was repeated over and 
over. The power of their message was amplified 
by their peculiar way of argumentation, which 
simultaneously played on sentiments («the de-
fence of the oppressed») and applied legal ar-
guments (peoples’ right to self-determination). 
In the emotionally charged atmosphere of the 
era, they exploited all instances of persecution 
to demonstrate that the Austrians were driven 
by the same hatred of the Slavs as the German, 
and that the Czech support the Entente coura-
geously10. The programme of the destruction of 
5 Soutou G-H. L’Europe de 1815 à nos jours. Paris, 2007. 
P. 166.
6 Soutou G.-H. Les grandes puissances et la question 
des nationalités en Europe centrale et orientale. P. 703.
7 Soutou G.-H. Diplomatie de guerre (Chapitre XIX). 
P. 571.
8 Soutou G.-H. L’Europe de 1815 à nos jours. P. 168.
9 Marès А. Edvard Beneš, de la gloire à l’abîme. P. 68.
10 Ibid. P. 73. 
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Austria-Hungary was completed by sketching 
up a credible alternative: they wished to call 
to life a Czechoslovakian-Romanian-Yugo-
slav alliance that would cooperate with Poland 
in order to stop the German encroachment1. 
The advocacy potentials of the Czech organ-
ization were further increased by the fact that 
the East-Central European emigrants living in 
France – especially the Czech and the South 
Slavs – cooperated with each other closely dur-
ing the war: for instance, they formed a solid 
unity against the separate peace efforts of the 
Monarchy2.
According to Fejtő, the freemason lodges, 
which had a decisive influence over the press 
and the political life, served as a crucial hinter-
land for the propaganda activities of Masaryk 
and Beneš in France3. Antoine Marès also talks 
about freemasonry as an important base of the 
social networking of the Czech emigration. In 
his book about Beneš, he claims that the pub-
lication of the Beneš’ brochure Détruisez l’Au-
triche-Hongrie ! would have been financed by 
the masonic lodge Grand Orient4. According 
to him, these threads would also explain the 
tightness of the Czechoslovakian–Yugoslav 
relations. However, he has found no evidence 
that the main leaders of the Czech emigrants, 
hence Masaryk, Beneš and their fellow Milan 
R. Štefanik would have been freemasons dur-
ing the war5.
The French government circles did not see 
clearly in the matter of the complicated evolve-
ment of the nationalities of the region, thus e.g. 
about the effects of the diversion activities of 
the German among the Polish and the Ukrain-
ian, whose leaders were also deeply divided. 
The obscurity was aggravated by the fact that 
experts and “fake experts” often put forth es-
sentially diverging views6. 
The extremely poor French knowledge 
about the region, coupled with the increased 
strategic importance of the latter, generated 
a high demand for intermediaries who could 
1 Ibid. P. 74. 
2 Ibid. P. 98-99. 
3 Fejtő F. Requiem pour un empire défunt. P. 341-342.
4 Marès A. Edvard Beneš, de la gloire à l’abîme. P. 97. 
The author refers to Pozzi, H. Les Coupables. Documents 
officiels inédits sur les responsabilités de la guerre et les 
dessous de la paix. Éditions européennes, 1935. P. 322.
5 Marès A. Edvard Beneš, de la gloire à l’abîme. P. 97-98.
6 Recherches sur la France et le problème des nationalités 
pendant la première guerre mondiale (Pologne, Ukraine, 
Lithuanie). P. 6. 
pass on seemingly reliable knowledge about 
East-Central Europe. Besides the French 
Slavists, the political emigrants originating from 
this region played a crucial role in that: they 
provided visibility for their people and «com-
prehension» for their demands on behalf of the 
allied great powers7. From the end of the 19th 
century, the intellectuals having emigrated from 
this region became the visible imprints of the 
increasingly active national movements, the 
“matrices of self-identity”8. Masaryk and Beneš 
acted as knowledgeable experts of the region, 
and by delivering a coherent programme, they 
were able to influence the international deci-
sions affecting their nation9.
The question arises: Was it the collapse of 
the empires that enabled the foundation of the 
nation-states in East-Central Europe? Or, may-
be, the dissolution of the continental empires 
resulted from the development of the regional 
national movements? Finally, did the congenial 
propaganda activities of the individual emigra-
tions play a decisive role10? In my opinion, all 
these components were at action simultane-
ously, mutually reinforcing each other.
The French government used the nation-
al principle merely as a tactical weapon. In 
the end, Paris subordinated everything to the 
single objective of creating a counterpoise in 
East-Central Europe that could resist Germa-
ny. Therefore using the rhetoric of the liberation 
of «the oppressed nations», it promoted the 
creation of states involving a populous minor-
ity like Poland and Czechoslovakia11. It is im-
portant to underline that not even the French 
radicals wanted to enforce the purely national 
aspect over the strategic considerations. Even 
Franklin-Bouillon, the President of the Foreign 
Policy Committee of the House of Represent-
atives, who was highly supportive of the Czech 
and Polish emigration, emphasized in July 
7 Davion I. Conceptions de l’Europe centrale et orientale, 
des empires multinationaux à l’entre-deux-guerres/ 
L’Europe de Versailles à Maastricht. Moments, enjeux, 
acteurs. Éditions Seli Arslan, 2007. P. 52-53. 
8 Renouvin P. La Crise européenne et la Première guerre 
mondiale. Paris, 1969. Cited by: Davion, I. Conceptions de 
l’Europe centrale et orientale. P. 55. 
9 Marès А. Edvard Beneš, de la gloire à l’abîme. P. 117.
10 Davion I. Conceptions de l’Europe centrale et orientale. 
P. 57 ; Davion refers to Milza, P. Les relations internationales 
de 1918 à 1939. Paris: Armand Colin, 1995. Also, see: 
Fejtő, Requiem pour un empire défunt. 
11 Soutou G.-H. Diplomatie de guerre (Chapitre XIX). 
P. 571; Soutou, L’Europe de 1815 à nos jours. P. 167-168.
Раздел I
Первая мировая война в исторических судьбах Австро-Венгрии и России
55
1918 that «a barrier should be built from viable 
states against Germany», even at the price of 
«compromising the nationality principle»1. Fur-
thermore, politicians were also conscious of the 
risk of creating weak small states, which would 
«Balkanize» the region. In order to avoid that, 
many supported the creation of politically, mil-
itarily and economically strong «big nations» 
even at the price of letting one nation prevail 
over the other within the same country. The 
adherents of this conception strived to create 
multi-component, but more or less homogene-
ous states with a historically «more advanced» 
nation that would have the mission to lead the 
others. That was how they perceived the situa-
tion of the Serbs in Yugoslavia or the Czechs is 
1 Soutou G.-H. Jean Pélissier et l’Office Central des 
Nationalités. P. 33, 37. 
Czechoslovakia. The standardizing and central-
izing French Jacobin model was also proposed 
as a potential analogy2. Philippe Berthelot, one 
of the influential French shapers of the Par-
is treaties did not even mention nationalities, 
but rather, he talked about the «four pillars» of 
French foreign policy in relation to East-Central 
Europe that would be France’s allies in an effort 
to contain Germany. These allies included the 
resurrected Poland, Czechoslovakia patched 
together from historical Czech territories and 
regions inhabited mostly by Slovaks, the King-
dom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes born from 
the unification efforts of the Serbs and the South 
Slav peoples of the Monarchy and the enlarged 
Romania3.
2 Soutou G.-H. La France et le problème des nationalités 
pendant la guerre. P. 369-371, 395. 
3 Soutou G.-H. Les grandes puissances et la question 
des nationalités en Europe centrale et orientale. P. 705; 
Allain  et al. Histoire de la diplomatie française. P. 297-298.
